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EPISTEMIC TWO-DIMENSIONALISM AND ARGUMENTS
FROM EPISTEMIC MISCLASSIFICATION 1
Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen, Clas Weber
Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2D) claims that expressions have
a counterfactual intension and an epistemic intension. Epistemic intensions
reflect cognitive significance such that sentences with necessary epistemic
intensions are a priori. We defend E2D against an influential line of
criticism: arguments from epistemic misclassification. We focus in
particular on the arguments of Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. Such
arguments conclude that E2D is mistaken from (i) the claim that E2D is
committed to classifying certain sentences as a priori and (ii) the claim that
such sentences are a posteriori. We aim to show that these arguments are
unsuccessful as (i) and (ii) undercut each other. One must distinguish the
general framework of E2D from a specific implementation of it. The
framework is flexible enough to avoid commitment to the apriority of any
particular sentence; only specific implementations are so committed.
Arguments from epistemic misclassification are therefore better understood
as arguments for favouring one implementation of E2D over another, rather
than as refutations of E2D.

Keywords: Two-Dimensional Semantics, A priori, Descriptivism, Epistemic Argument,
Chalmers

1. Introduction
Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism (E2D) states that in addition to ordinary counterfactual
intensions expressions are associated with epistemic intensions. While the counterfactual
intension of an expression captures its modal profile, its epistemic intension reflects the
expression’s cognitive significance. Epistemic intensions are functions from scenarios, or
ways the world might be for all we know a priori, to extensions. For instance, the fact that
Hesperus is Phosphorus is metaphysically necessary suggests that the counterfactual
intensions of Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical, while the fact that the sentence is
cognitively significant and a posteriori suggests that their epistemic intensions are different.
According to the Core Thesis of E2D, a sentence is a priori if and only if it is epistemically
necessary, or true in all scenarios.
Fully competent speakers (that is, those who associate expressions with the right
epistemic intensions) are such that given sufficient information about what obtains at a
scenario, they can infer a priori what their expressions refer to in the scenario (if anything).
For example, given sufficient information about the distribution and behaviour of H2O
molecules in one’s environment, competent speakers are in a position to a priori infer that
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‘water’ refers to H2O. And given sufficient information about a scenario in which XYZ
molecules play this role, one is in a position to a priori infer that ‘water’ refers to XYZ. 2
E2D therefore seems committed to the apriority of sentences which make these inferences
explicit, such as conditionals with scenario descriptions in their antecedents, and identity
claims in their consequents, identifying the extension of the relevant expression with
something explicitly mentioned in the scenario description. Furthermore, it might be that an
expression’s extension at every scenario is determined by the instantiation of a finite set of
specific properties, which we may call reference-fixing properties. In that case, E2D seems
committed to the apriority of sentences that attribute such reference-fixing properties to the
expression’s referent. An influential line of criticism to this consequence takes the following
form:
Premise 1: E2D entails that sentence S is a priori.
Premise 2: S is not a priori.
Conclusion: E2D is mistaken.
We call arguments of this form arguments from epistemic misclassification. Examples can be
found in Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. We respond to Speaks and Schroeter and show
that arguments from epistemic misclassification cannot work because they are selfundermining. The two premises undercut each other: inasmuch as the first premise is
plausible, the second becomes implausible and vice versa. Hence, there is no instance of an
argument from epistemic misclassification where both premises are plausible.
Why do the two premises undercut each other? The general framework of E2D does
not associate any specific intension with a given expression. An implementation of E2D takes
a stand on this issue, thereby giving a semantics for that expression. But the question of
which implementation of E2D correctly applies to an expression depends in part on the
epistemic status of sentences using the expression. An adequate implementation of E2D will
respect our considered judgements about apriority. Hence, if the relevant sentence S is not a
priori (i.e., if Premise 2 is plausible), an implementation of E2D which predicts that it is a
priori is inadequate. We therefore have no reason to accept Premise 1: E2D is flexible
enough that there are a range of implementations available that can account for S’s
aposteriority. And conversely: if an implementation is adequate and is committed to the
apriority of S, then we have reason to reject Premise 2, since an adequate implementation of
E2D must be consistent with what sentences are a priori.
To illustrate, let S be ‘Gödel is the inventor of the incompleteness theorem’. In his
epistemic argument Kripke [1972] convincingly argued that S is not a priori. But it would be
wrong to take this as an argument against E2D. Rather, it is better seen as an argument for
implementations of E2D that associate ‘Gödel’ with an epistemic intension that does not pick
out the inventor of the incompleteness theorem in every scenario. In this case, the plausibility
of premise 2 undercuts the plausibility of premise 1.
Our defence of E2D is in the spirit of Frank Jackson’s [1998] response to Kripke.
Jackson interprets Kripke not as refuting the claim that names have a descriptive sense, but
rather as elucidating the descriptive sense they in fact have. In the same way, we can
understand Schroeter’s and Speaks’s arguments not as refutations of E2D, but as suggestions
for favouring certain implementations of E2D over others.
We first examine Speaks’s argument, which concludes that E2D is committed to
treating a particular set of sentences as a priori (§2). In response, we define several
implementations of E2D that avoid the kind of classification that Speaks argues is
2
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problematic (§3). Then we present an implementation that entails the apriority of Speaks’s
sentences (§4.1). This implementation may nonetheless be plausible, as Speaks’s case for the
aposteriority of the sentences is unsuccessful (§4.2). With these resources in place, we
respond to Schroeter’s argument in a similar manner (§5).

2. Speaks’s Argument from Epistemic Misclassification
Speaks uses the name ‘Mick Jagger’ as an example to launch an argument from epistemic
misclassification against E2D. He supposes that the epistemic intension associated with
‘Mick Jagger’ is such that its reference at each scenario is determined by the instantiation of a
set of specific properties. We will refer to this set of reference-fixing properties as Γ. It
includes such things as being the lead singer on Sympathy for the Devil and being a member
of the greatest band of the 1960s, and so on. Speaks [2010: 67] notes that we can divide this
set into two conjunctions of properties, F and G, such that ‘[e]very property I attribute to
Mick Jagger is included in one of the two, and many are included in both’.
Speaks’s argument requires that both F and G are individually rich enough to fix a
referent for ‘Mick Jagger’. 3 It is also important that ‘there is a rough parity between the two
as regards the number of properties in the two conjunctions and the centrality of those
properties to my conception of Mick Jagger’ [loc. cit.: 67]. That is, F and G each hold equal
weight regarding our deliberations on what to call ‘Mick Jagger’.
Speaks’s idea is that E2D must classify certain sentences involving the name ‘Mick
Jagger’ and the properties F and G as a priori—we will call these sentences the Mick Jagger
sentences. An example is ‘If Mick Jagger exists and he is the F but not G, then nothing is the
G’. Speaks claims that the Mick Jagger sentences are not plausibly a priori:
Premise 1: E2D entails that the Mick Jagger sentences are a priori.
Premise 2: The Mick Jagger sentences are not a priori.
Conclusion: E2D is mistaken.
We will outline Speaks’s argument for Premise 1 in a moment. Premise 2 makes appeal to a
limitation principle on a priori knowledge and inferences, principle [A]:
[A] On the basis of the knowledge that some particular thing n is F, you can’t
know a priori whether some other thing exists which instantiates some other
property G, if the two properties are independent. 4
[A] crucially depends on the notion of independence, which Speaks characterises as follows:
[. . .] two properties, F and G, are independent if and only if (1) F’s being
instantiated is compossible both with G’s being instantiated and its being
uninstantiated [and vice versa], and (2) F’s being instantiated does not a

A property’s being ‘rich enough for reference-determination’ can be clarified as follows: where Γ is set of
reference-fixing properties for ‘n’ and property P is one of its decompositions, P is rich enough for referencedetermination, if, upon learning that P is instantiated but the rest of Γ is uninstantiated, we would still judge
that n exists.
4
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be framed in terms of [A].
3

priori entail either G’s being instantiated, or G’s being uninstantiated [and
vice versa]. 5
[Speaks 2010: 60]
Given the prima facie plausibility of [A], E2D would seem to be in trouble if it conflicts with
this principle.
Let us call a scenario in which a name fails to refer an empty scenario for that name.
As E2D holds that competent speakers can a priori determine the reference of a name at a
scenario, they will be in a position to a priori recognize empty scenarios. Speaks’s argument
for Premise 1, which we’ll call the Empty Scenario Argument, uses this supposed ability to
derive the Mick Jagger sentences.
The first step of Speaks’s Empty Scenario Argument takes the independence of F and
G to imply that there is at least one scenario where the following is true:
[1] Something is the F, and something else is the G.
The second step of the argument uses parity reasoning to argue that E2D must count
scenarios where [1] holds as empty [loc. cit.: 68]. Since F and G have equal weight as
potential reference-determiners for ‘Mick Jagger’, in scenarios where [1] holds there are (at
least) two equally good candidates for the name. But in such scenarios, ‘Mick Jagger’ must
deliver no reference, since there is no reason to attach that name to one candidate over the
other. 6 (We will assume that a name can only have a single referent at a scenario.) Hence it
seems that according to E2D, a competent user of ‘Mick Jagger’ is in a position to know a
priori that if [1] is true, then Mick Jagger does not exist. This suggests that the following is a
priori:
[2] If something is the F, and something else is the G, then it is not the case
that Mick Jagger exists.
And given the apriority of [2], its contraposition [3] will be a priori:
[3] If Mick Jagger exists, then it is not the case that something is the F, and
something else is the G.
Furthermore, from [3], we can derive [4]:
[4] If Mick Jagger exists and he is the F but not G, then nothing is the G.
This is because the existence of Mick Jagger entails that either (i) the F is the G, or (ii)
nothing is the F, or (iii) nothing is the G. But the fact that Mick Jagger is the F and is not G
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candidates than either the F or the G will be impossible where [1] is true.

rules out both (i) and (ii). We are therefore left to conclude that (iii) must be true: nothing can
be the G.
Sentences [2] to [4] are the Mick Jagger sentences, and the above suggests that E2D
has to count them as a priori. But for Speaks, this is in conflict with plausible limits on a
priori knowability. About [3], Speaks [2010: 68] writes: ‘given knowledge that Mick Jagger
exists, one cannot deduce a priori that it is not the case that one thing is F, and something
else is G’. 7
Moreover, saying that [4] is a priori brings E2D into direct conflict with principle
[A]. We can make the conflict explicit by letting property H equal being the F and not G, and
property I equal being the G. Then H and I are independent (at least insofar as F and G are
independent). But if [4] is a priori then from knowledge that some particular thing (Mick
Jagger) is H, we can infer a priori that nothing is I—which is exactly what [A] tells us we
cannot do.
In the following section, we discuss Premise 1 and whether E2D is committed to the
apriority of sentences like [2] to [4], where the instances of F and G in those sentences are
reference-fixing properties that are independent (in the appropriate sense). We argue that
E2D is not so committed. Then, in §4, we turn to Premise 2 and to whether the Mick Jagger
sentences ought to be counted as a posteriori. We argue that Speaks’s case for treating them
in this way is unsuccessful.

3. Discussion of Premise 1
3.1 Independence and Uniqueness
Speaks’s case for Premise 1 is the Empty Scenario Argument. An initial problem with this
argument is that its very first step is invalid. From the fact that F and G are independent, it
does not follow that there is a scenario where something is the F and something else is the G.
Amongst the set of properties Γ that Speaks includes as being associated with the name
‘Mick Jagger’ are such things as being the lead singer on Sympathy for the Devil and being
the star of Freejack. The definite article implies uniqueness. Now suppose the following:
F = being the tallest person in the world and rich
G = being the tallest person in the world and tidy
So defined, F and G are independent: the fact that Charlie is the tallest person in the world
and rich neither necessitates nor a priori entails whether or not there exists something which
is the tallest person in the world and tidy. However, if we know that something is the tallest
person in the world and rich, we can infer a priori that nothing else can be the tallest person
in the world and tidy—for at most one thing can be the tallest person in the world. The mere
independence of F and G is insufficient to establish that there is a scenario in which [1] is
true.
Worse still, the same sort of reasoning allows us to generate counterexamples to
principle [A] using uniqueness properties. For instance, just by knowing that Charlie is the
tallest person in the world and rich (F), we can infer a priori that no one else can be the tallest
person in the world and tidy (G), despite the independence of F and G. [A] states that this is
impossible.
7

More precisely, [3] implies that we can deduce that it’s not the case that something is the F, and something else
is the G.

The definition of independence must be updated to rule out these clear
counterexamples to [A]. We can do this by adding to the definition of independence
mentioned in §2 the further clause that F and G can be instantiated by different things (at the
same time and at the same world). Let us refer to this updated notion as independence*. Our
question now is: will we be able to divide the set of reference-fixing properties for ‘Mick
Jagger’ into conjunctive properties F and G, such that F and G are both rich enough for
reference-determination and independent*?
In the following, we discuss two types of implementation of E2D under which such
divisions are impossible, and a third that allows this kind of division but in a way that
nonetheless blocks Speaks’s argument. 8

3.2 The Common Element Theory
Speaks’s argument does not apply to any implementation of E2D which implies the
following: any decompositions F and G of Γ that are each rich enough for referencedetermination will include a common reference-fixing property of the form being the unique
P. This is because F and G would then fail to be independent*, as we have just demonstrated.
It is not implausible to think that an adequate semantics for proper names would have
this consequence. Two important factors in the determination of a name’s reference are how
the relevant community uses that term, and the causal chains that link the usage of that name
to the world. So for example, we might have an implementation of E2D which implies that
for a given name n, when determining reference we always include as a reference-fixing
element some meta-linguistic property, such as being the most natural object at the causal
origin of a representational practice with tokens of ‘n’. Another possibility might be being
the referent of my community’s usage of the term ‘n’. That we had better include some such
common element among the reference-fixing properties is a lesson many have drawn from
[Putnam 1975] and [Burge 1979]. 9
We can call this kind of implementation a Common Element theory. Common
Element theories block Speaks’s argument in its early stages. Such implementations imply
that [1] is epistemically impossible, because the F and the G are not independent*. Sentences
[2] to [4] then come out a priori. But this is not problematic. Speaks argues that the Mick
Jagger sentences are not plausibly a priori because he supposes that the reference-fixing
properties F and G that figure in those sentences are independent. For the appropriate notion
of ‘independence’, this assumption fails: the sentences that a Common Element theory is
committed to classifying as a priori are not the problematic sentences that Speaks requires for
his argument.

3.3 The Simple Property Theory
A second type of implementation which is immune to the Empty Scenario Argument appeals
to what we might call a Simple Property theory. Speaks’s argument presupposes that the
property which determines the reference of ‘Mick Jagger’ is highly complex (or that it is a set
containing numerous properties). According to Simple Property theory, however, the
associated reference-fixing property is relatively simple. Even though we can allow for a
minimal degree of complexity, the relevant property will be such that no part of it is by itself
8
9

For the most part, we follow Speaks in working with an intuitive notion of property.
As we discuss in §5, Schroeter [2005] argues that E2D is committed to something like these suggestions,
before arguing that E2D therefore misclassifies a posteriori sentences as a priori.

rich enough for reference-determination. 10 If such an implementation were correct, then we
cannot divide this property into an F and a G where each can individually pick out Mick
Jagger, and we will not be able to construct the corresponding empty scenarios. It is worth
noting here that many of the actual proposals put forward by proponents of two-dimensional
semantics have used simple properties: Chalmers [2006: §3.4] and Jackson [2010] suggest
deferential properties; while many related semantic theories have similar structures—for
example, Kroon [1987] and Lewis [1997] place emphasis on the role of causal meta-linguistic
properties. 11
For both Common Element and Simple Property theories, there can be no divisions of
Γ into two different properties, which are independent* and rich enough to fix the reference
of ‘Mick Jagger’. For this reason, they are not committed to the apriority of any sentences
like [2] to [4] containing independent* Fs and Gs. On the other hand, Common Element and
certain Simple Property theories have to confront Kripke’s epistemic argument. However,
this argument is best understood as an attack on so-called ‘famous deeds’ versions of
descriptivism [Lewis 1997], or certain naive theories about what properties determine
reference. It is far from clear that Kripke has shown that the sentences which the mentioned
Common Element and Simple Property implementations treat as a priori are in fact a
posteriori—in fact, Kripke’s own armchair methodology suggests that they are not [Jackson
1998]. However, E2D is not committed to the apriority of any such sentence, as we now
show.

3.4 The Non-Descriptivist Theory
Speaks [2010: 60] stresses that he is arguing against non-descriptivism. A non-descriptivist
E2Dist allows that the properties which determine the reference of a name can differ from
scenario to scenario: ‘It is worth emphasizing that the relevant [reference determining]
description will typically vary between different scenarios’ [loc. cit.: 67].
For some scenarios, for example, we may have to decide if something is F or G (or
both) to settle the name’s reference. But for other scenarios, perhaps only F is considered, or
G, or even some completely different property P (and so on). There may be no finite set of
properties that we use to determine reference—each individual scenario might in principle be
coupled with its own unique method for reference-determination.
Once descriptivism is off the table, it is no longer clear how to derive the contested
claims a priori. Is the non-descriptivist E2Dist committed to the apriority of [2]? It does not
appear so. Given that we might sometimes use property P, say, to fix the reference of ‘Mick
Jagger’, it is rather easy for [2] to come out a posteriori. All we need for [2]’s apriority to fail
is for there to be some scenario in which [1] is true, and in which Mick Jagger is identified as
the P instead. The fact that in this scenario something is the F and something else is the G
then does not entail Mick Jagger’s non-existence, as he is the P there. Given nondescriptivism, we see no reason why there should not be such a scenario. As [2] is false in
this scenario, it does not hold in every scenario. Thus, the non-descriptivist E2Dist is not
committed to its apriority, nor to the apriority of [3] and [4].
A non-descriptivist implementation of E2D is not committed to the apriority of any
such sentence using ordinary natural language predicates. It will treat as a priori an infinitely
10
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enough for reference determination, since we would judge that Mick Jagger does not exist if we were to learn
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11
Chalmers’s considered view appears to be a non-descriptivist implementation of E2D, discussed in the next
section.

long claim of the form: ‘Mick Jagger, if he exists, is the P and such that scenario 1 obtains, or
is the Q and such that scenario 2 obtains, or is the R and such that scenario 3 obtains, or . . .’.
The labels scenario 1, scenario 2, and so on stand for (potentially infinite) descriptions of
entire scenarios. One might then construct corresponding predicates F and G from this
sentence, e.g. let F equal being the P and such that scenario 1 obtains and G equal being the
Q and such that scenario 2 obtains. However, the corresponding predicates cannot be used to
mount an argument from epistemic misclassification. Since F and G are now relativised to
specific scenarios the corresponding Mick Jagger sentences will uncontroversially come out a
priori. For instance, for the above F and G, it will be a priori that [1] is false: we can a priori
exclude the joint existence of the F and the G, as one requires scenario 1 to obtain, while the
other requires scenario 2 to obtain. We can then also infer [2] to [4] a priori.
To sum up: arguments from epistemic misclassification against E2D are better seen as
arguments for favouring certain implementations of E2D over others. Any adequate
implementation of E2D will have to account for our considered judgments about apriority.
The relevant judgments need not be our quick everyday judgments, but may involve the
assessments of an ideally rational subject. And if we judge a sentence S as not being a priori,
then we consider its negation to be an epistemic possibility, i.e. there will be a scenario which
falsifies S. If these judgements are accurate, we cannot accept as adequate any
implementation of E2D that assigns S a semantic value under which S is true in every
scenario. So if a certain implementation of E2D is in conflict with our considered judgments
about a sentence’s epistemic status, all this tells us is that we have a strong reason to think
that the implementation in question is inadequate.
So it seems that E2D is not committed to the apriority of any sentences like [2] to [4],
where those include independent* Fs and Gs which are rich enough for reference-fixing. In
the next section, we will present an implementation of E2D which entails the apriority of the
sentences, even when F and G are independent* properties rich enough to fix reference. We
then defend this implementation against Speaks’s argument. We conclude that, assuming the
adequacy of this implementation, Premise 2 is implausible.

4. Discussion of Premise 2
4.1 The Unique Best Deserver Theory
What must an implementation of E2D look like to validate the Empty Scenario Argument?
The argument appears to suppose the following:
1. It is possible to split Γ into two sets of independent* properties, F and G, which
are each rich enough to fix the reference of ‘Mick Jagger’.
2. Candidate referents are weighted as better or worse by some function, and
reference goes to the best candidate.
3. At all scenarios where [1] is true, the F and the G will be considered the two
best candidates for being the referent of ‘Mick Jagger’.
4. At all scenarios where [1] is true, ‘Mick Jagger’ cannot refer to both the F and the
G. 12

12

Speaks [2010: 11] allows that this assumption can be weakened. In that case, he argues, E2D would need to
treat as a priori a different set of sentences, which are equally problematic.

The first assumption is denied by Common Element and Simple Property implementations;
while non-descriptivist implementations are in a position to deny the third assumption.
Thus, it seems that Speaks is ascribing to the E2Dist something at least very similar to
what we call a Unique Best Deserver theory. This theory states that for a given name n, the
set Γn of reference-fixing properties associated with n can be divided into different potential
candidates (like the F and the G), which can be weighted as better or worse reference
determiners, by some function. Reference then goes to whatever uniquely satisfies both (a)
being a sufficiently good deserver of the name, and (b) being such that there are no better
deservers of the name. If nothing satisfies both (a) and (b) at a scenario, or more than one
thing does, then the name has no reference at that scenario. 13
Unique Best Deserver theory states that the following sentence can be known solely
on the basis of fully understanding its meaning: ‘If Mick Jagger exists, then Mick Jagger is
the unique best deserver of Γ’. Suppose for simplicity that Γ contains just three properties, R,
S and T, and that only property count matters when weighing potential candidates. Then, it
would be a priori for competent speakers that ‘Mick Jagger’ refers (if at all) to either the
‘perfect deserver’, P (i.e., R, S, and T), or if no Ps exist, at most one of the F (R and S) or the
G (S and T) or the H (R and T), where F, G and H are all equally good ‘near-perfect’
deservers. For larger sets of associated properties, there might also be ‘near-near-perfect’
deservers, and so on.
Consider an agent who knows that Γ is the relevant set of properties to consider when
determining the reference of ‘Mick Jagger’. What could she know a priori? Well, under a
Unique Best Deserver theory, the Empty Scenario Argument drops out as a simple matter of
logical consequence, because all of the information that we need to tease out [2] to [4] is
contained in the proposition expressed by ‘Mick Jagger exists’. A fully competent speaker
could not have knowledge that ‘Mick Jagger exists’ without knowing that there is only a
single thing which is a sufficiently good deserver of Γ, and for which nothing else is a better
deserver of Γ. But even with this knowledge we can infer some interesting consequences: if
the F and the G are equally good near-perfect deservers, then we can deem scenarios where
[1] holds to be empty scenarios for ‘Mick Jagger’—for in those scenarios there are two
equally good candidates for the name, and no better candidates. Sentences [2] to [4] then
follow straightforwardly. So there is an implementation using independent* properties which
entails that the Mick Jagger sentences are a priori and so conflicts with Speaks’s principle.

4.2 The Limitation Principle on A Priori Knowledge
The crucial question is whether commitment to the apriority of [2] to [4] is problematic.
Speaks argues that it is, since it conflicts with his limitation principle [A]. However, not only
are there counterexamples to the principle formulated with the notion of ‘independence’
(§3.1), there are also counterexamples to the principle formulated with the improved notion
of ‘independence*’. The updated principle reads
[A*] On the basis of the knowledge that some particular thing n is F, you can’t
know a priori whether some other thing exists which instantiates some other
property G, if the two properties are independent*.

13

We grant that the properties F and G are independent* for the following discussion. A Unique Best Deserver
theory is not committed to this: it allows that all potential candidates for ‘Mick Jagger’ might not be
independent*, in which case the apriority of [2] to [4] follows unproblematically for the reasons discussed in
§3.2.

Consider the following case: ‘We hereby dub Julius to be the man who invented the zip (if
there is one)’. Consider the properties being the unique man and being the unique inventor.
Even though these properties are not the stipulated reference-fixers for ‘Julius’ (being the
unique inventor is not shorthand for being the unique inventor of the zip) they are nonetheless
independent* of each other. Now suppose we are given the knowledge that the sentence
‘Julius exists’ is true. From this, we can deduce that it is not the case that there is only one
man in the world that is not identical to the only inventor. So we know the following
conditional: ‘If Julius exists, then it is not the case that there’s something that’s the man, and
something else which is the inventor’. But this sentence is formally identical to [3], and is
plausibly a priori.
And just as we can stipulate what ‘Julius’ refers to in order to generate an a priori
truth analogous to [3], so too can we make stipulations that generate a priori truths analogous
to [4] yielding counterexamples to [A*]. Let ‘Cobber’ refer to whoever does my laundry, or
whoever cooks my dinner; but if someone does my laundry while someone else cooks my
dinner, then ‘Cobber’ will not refer. Now suppose I learn that Cobber cooked my dinner but
did not do my laundry. I can infer from this knowledge that no one did my laundry. And I
don’t need to empirically check that my clothes are clean to justifiably infer this. I simply
need to reason that since Cobber cooked my dinner and did not do my laundry, then no one
could have done my laundry, since otherwise Cobber wouldn’t have existed. As being the
person who cooked my dinner and did not do my laundry and being the person who did my
laundry are independent* properties, we have a counterexample to [A*].
So in spite of its prima facie plausibility, [A*] does not stand up to scrutiny. There are
some key things to keep in mind when assessing this principle. Firstly, it concerns which
propositions we are in a position to infer a priori from ‘knowledge that some particular thing
n is F’. The principle does not impose any restriction on which names can go in for n. As
such, an opponent cannot reject the above discussion as irrelevant by arguing that ordinary
proper names are not like stipulated names. ‘Cobber’ is a counterexample regardless of
whether it is a stipulated name.
Secondly, there are two readings of the crucial phrase ‘knowledge that some
particular thing n is F’: a de re and a de dicto reading. Even the E2Dist can accept the
principle on a de re reading. For example, someone who has never heard the name ‘Mick
Jagger’ may know of Mick Jagger that he is the F and not G (for example, by observing a
stranger who happens to be Mick Jagger), without being in a position to know that nothing is
the G. Speaks has given us no reason for thinking that any implementation of E2D is
committed to saying that [5] is a priori:
[5] If something is the F and is not G, then nothing is the G.
In fact, [5] cannot be a priori insofar as [1] is epistemically possible, because [1] states that
something could be the F and something else could be the G. So E2D only conflicts with
[A*] under a de dicto reading.
The correctness of the principle then depends on which proposition is picked out by
the phrase ‘n is F’. This crucially depends in turn on the correct semantics for the name n.
The principle may be plausible if one assumes a direct reference semantics for the name, on
which the phrase expresses a singular proposition. However, if one invokes [A*] in an
argument against certain implementations of E2D, one obviously cannot assume a reading of
the principle which presupposes such a semantics without begging the question. Different
implementations of E2D assign n different intensions, and if a Unique Best Deserver theory
is true of n, then knowing that n is F may well allow us to infer that nothing else is G—even
if F and G are independent*. Perhaps our considered intuitions strongly suggest that [4] in

particular is not a priori, and the principle just helped to bring this out. But, as noted above,
this only means that a Unique Best Deserver theory is not an adequate implementation, and
the E2Dist would be wise to opt for an alternative. 14
So it is not obvious that a conflict with [A*] should be considered problematic for any
implementation of E2D. Premise 2 therefore requires further argument: a Unique Best
Deserver theory—with the help of uniqueness clauses and simple logic—provides a perfectly
good explanation of how knowledge of the proposition expressed by ‘Mick Jagger exists’
puts fully competent speakers in a position to derive the contested sentences a priori. Thus,
there are a range of implementations that avoid Speaks’s argument in various ways.

5. Schroeter’s Argument from Epistemic Misclassification
Speaks [2010: 66] states that his argument is a generalisation of the argument of Schroeter
[2005]. For the most part their arguments take the same form, except for two main
differences. Firstly, Schroeter argues that E2D must accept a particular implementation,
whereas Speaks simply assumes a specific implementation for his argument. Secondly,
Schroeter does not appeal to a limitation principle to show that the implementation she
considers misclassifies certain sentences as a priori. Instead, she appeals directly to the
reader’s intuitions about the relevant sentences to gather agreement that they are not a priori.
Schroeter argues that E2D must accept a particular implementation, according to
which meta-linguistic properties are necessary for determinate reference in scenarios—such
that without knowledge of their instantiation, one cannot know whether a name (or natural
kind term) has reference at all. As she [2005: 337] notes, our commonsense interpretative
intuitions suggest that we need to ‘take into account how a token of a word like ‘water’ is
causally related to a particular temporally-extended representational practice within the world
to be considered as actual’. From this, Schroeter infers that at scenarios where there is no
such history of representational practice, it will be indeterminate whether terms like ‘water’
and ‘language’ have reference at all.
Schroeter then argues that this implies that ‘language exists’ and ‘if water exists then
language exists’ come out a priori according to E2D. If we must know what meta-linguistic
properties (e.g. properties regarding our community’s usage of ‘language’) are instantiated to
determine the reference of ‘language’ at a scenario, then ‘language’ will have no determinate
reference at scenarios where those properties are not instantiated. But then, the only scenarios
where ‘language exists’ has a determinate truth value will be ones where there is language.
So, ‘language exists’ will be true at all scenarios where it has a determinate truth-value, and
so it must be a priori. Similarly, if ‘water’ only has a determinate extension in worlds where
certain meta-linguistic properties are instantiated, then one will be able to infer the existence
of language a priori from knowledge of the existence of water. But, intuitively, ‘language
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Speaks might concede that [2] to [4] hold in every scenario, and so are epistemically necessary, but deny that
they are a priori on the basis of principle [A*]. In fact Speaks concludes with such a manoeuvre [loc. cit.: 76–
77]. However, there is at least a very close connection between epistemic necessity and apriority traditionally
conceived. For example, if [2] to [4] are epistemically necessary then they hold come what may (and so cannot
be refuted by experience). Furthermore, it is possible to know them without appeal to experiences of the actual
world: an ideal reasoner with the capacity to conceive all scenarios can just ignore the way the actual world is
and evaluate [2] to [4] at every scenario in thought. This allows a UBD theorist to withhold her scepticism of
[A*] and respond by distinguishing two notions of apriority: apriority1 (epistemic necessity) and apriority2
which obeys [A*] by definition. Both parties can then just agree that [2] to [4] are a priori1 but not a priori2.

exists’ and ‘if water exists then language exists’ are not a priori. This is Schroeter’s argument
against E2D. 15
However, insofar as the apriority of these sentences seem implausible, that merely
suggests that the associated reference-fixing properties are more complex than what
Schroeter argues. While it may be the case that we take such meta-linguistic considerations
into account when considering worlds where there is a history of linguistic practice, it also
seems plausible that there are other factors that might come into play—particularly when
considering scenarios where there is no history of linguistic practice. For example, given a
non-descriptivist implementation of E2D, the properties that determine reference in scenarios
where there is a history of linguistic practice are likely to differ from those in scenarios
without such practices. In such scenarios, perhaps we revert to intrinsic structural or
functional properties to determine what the reference of ‘water’ is, for example. Similarly for
a Unique Best Deserver implementation: perhaps meta-linguistic considerations carry a lot of
weight when considering reference at a scenario, but there may be other properties that we
might use even when there is no history of representational practice to appeal to.
To bring out the role of non-meta-linguistic properties in the determination of
reference we consider two scenarios: one where the meta-linguistic facts obtain but are
overridden by more important factors for reference determination, and another where there is
no history of representational practice yet we have determinate reference. Consider a scenario
in which our community uses the term ‘water’ to refer to all and only the fluffiest unicorns.
Should we say that our usage of ‘water’ refers to the fluffiest unicorns at that scenario?
Presumably not. Rather, if that scenario turned out to be actual, it would be intuitive to think
that we simply mean something different by ‘water’ than the rest of our community. It seems,
then, that our own rich conception of what water is plays at least some role in reference
determination. 16
Now consider a solipsistic scenario where nothing exists except one’s own subjective
experiences. Is there water at this scenario? The answer seems to be, determinately, no. We
do not need to appeal to a community within the scenario to tell us this. All we need is
competence with ‘water’. Indeed, if someone was unsure as to whether water obtained at this
simple scenario, that would be a sure sign that they have either not fully grasped the meaning
of ‘water’ or have not fully understood the scenario. On the other hand, if one confidently
insisted that there can be no determinate reference for ‘water’ in this scenario in virtue of
there being no communal usage of the term, then perhaps they use ‘water’ slightly differently
from us—such that ‘if water exists then language exists’ really is a priori when it is
interpreted in accordance with their deviant usage of ‘water’. Either way, the two key
premises of Schroeter’s argument undercut each other:
Premise 1: E2D entails that ‘language exists’ and ‘if water exists then language
exists’ are a priori.
Premise 2: These sentences are not a priori.
15

We find Schroeter’s argument for the claim that terms whose reference is fixed only by meta-linguistic
properties have indeterminate referential status in scenarios without such meta-linguistic properties,
problematic. Furthermore, it is not obvious that E2D is committed to apriority being truth in all scenarios
where it has determinate truth value, as opposed to being truth in all scenarios simpliciter. However, we will
grant these points for present purposes.
16
The point we make here seems plausible for ‘water’, but perhaps not for terms for which we do not have a
rich conception. For example, imagine we just heard the utterance ‘there is gzorply’. Intuitively, for scenarios
where our community uses ‘gzorply’ to refer to fluffy unicorns, we would say that our usage of ‘gzorply’
refers to fluffy unicorns. So perhaps, given that we know nothing non-meta-linguistic about the term, we will
judge the sentence ‘if gzorplies exist then language exists’ to be true in every scenario where it’s defined. But
it is not obvious that this sentence is a posteriori, whereas ‘if water exists then language exists’ clearly is.

Conclusion: E2D is mistaken.
Insofar as premise one is plausible, premise two is implausible. And insofar as premise two is
plausible, premise one is implausible. Schroeter’s argument, like Speaks’s, is an argument
against E2D from epistemic misclassification. Such arguments, we have argued, are selfundermining.

6. Conclusion
We have argued that Speaks’s and Schroeter’s attempts to show that E2D misclassifies
certain sentences as a priori has failed. We can draw at least two philosophically significant
morals. Firstly, it is important to distinguish the general framework of E2D from specific
implementations. E2D is a flexible framework that is consistent with numerous different
ways of implementing it in the context of providing a semantics for natural language. Thus,
any argument against E2D that relies on a specific implementation should be treated with
suspicion. Secondly, we have shown that objections to E2D that rely on specific
implementations, particularly objections that try to bring those implementations into conflict
with our considered intuitions about what sentences are a priori, are better reformulated as
arguments for favouring one implementation over another. The correct implementation of
E2D will be the one that captures all of our idealised judgements regarding apriority. While
we have not here argued for a specific implementation, we nonetheless hope to have provided
some resources to help discover the correct one. 17
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